Licences, SWMS, and an audit trail that shows tampering

Every licence with its number, issuer, class and expiry, and a dashboard that counts what has expired and what expires inside thirty, sixty and ninety days — filterable to the site the guards are rostered at.

A platform-wide catalogue of security licence classes across eight Australian jurisdictions, named against their actual regulators — and any entry whose code could not be confirmed is marked as a placeholder to correct, not stated as fact.

Four exclusive bands swept in the background, one notification per item per band, idempotent — so a licence expiring is noticed four times before it lapses rather than once after.

Licences, qualifications, training, police checks, working-with-children checks, right to work, vehicle registration, contractor insurance and site certificates all satisfy a requirement through one evaluator — and a requirement marked blocking is the one the roster enforces.

Organisation, site, client, role, contractor, refresher and return-to-work inductions in one register covering employees, contractor workers and office staff alike, each with its coverage state rather than a tick.

A safe work method statement and a safe work procedure are carried apart, because most security work is not construction work — and a new version moves the pointer, so yesterday’s sign-on stops satisfying today’s requirement.

Policies, procedures and post orders versioned, issued, acknowledged — and the receipt records a hash of the object the person was shown rather than the label they signed, so "I signed a different version" is answerable.

A patrol vehicle’s walk-around filed from the phone, where the pass or fail is derived on the server from the answers rather than sent by the client — and a failed safety-critical line raises a work order in the same transaction.

Every write sequenced and chained per organisation under a uniqueness constraint that makes a forked chain impossible, with the actor and the credential inside the hash — so an attribution cannot be rewritten afterwards either.

Nineteen tables holding employment, pay, recruitment and background-check records log who read them, enforced in the data layer rather than per screen — so a privacy question has an answer that is not "probably nobody".